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Thoughts on the proper design of macro stress tests 
Petr Jakubík and Gregory D Sutton
1 
1. Introduction 
This paper provides an introduction to macro stress tests and argues that these exercises 
could be an important part of enhanced macroprudential policies.
2 Macro stress tests are 
executed by financial sector supervisors and central banks usually with (1) the aid of key 
financial institutions and (2) objectives that are different to those of stress tests run by 
financial firms for internal risk management purposes. For example, macro stress tests were 
undertaken during the recent international financial crisis with the aim of restoring confidence 
in financial systems (Bank of England (2008); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (2009a, 2009b); Committee of European Banking Supervisors (2010)). Macro stress 
tests are also conducted during “good times” to search for potential sources of systemic risk. 
No matter when they are undertaken, macro stress tests usually estimate the losses that a 
group of financial institutions considered key to the proper functioning of a financial system, 
usually a group of large banks, could suffer under adverse macroeconomic developments or 
other shocks.  
Macro stress tests could be an important part of enhanced macroprudential policies, because 
the recent financial crisis has shown the stress testing practices of a number of large banks 
to be seriously flawed. The difficulties some of them had dealing with the risks that emerged 
proves this. However, it was suggested even earlier that there were problems with financial 
firms’ stress testing practices. In particular, the UK Financial Services Authority (2006) 
indicated that it was surprised by the mildness of the firm-wide stress tests undertaken by 
some financial firms, and the agency concluded that financial institutions might be 
underestimating the likelihood of severe events. This might be considered a logical 
consequence of short human memories and the prolonged period of favourable economic 
conditions prior to the crisis. Interestingly, the possibility that short memories can undermine 
successful risk management is consistent with the findings of Jiménez and Saurina (2006).   
While “short memories” might explain why the stress tests run by a number of financial 
institutions were not severe enough, and thus left them too exposed, we believe that another 
flaw in stress testing practices also played an important role. This is the tendency for banks’ 
firm-wide stress tests to focus on either the trading or loan book but not the combined market 
and credit risk losses associated with adverse shocks. Yet banks with sizable trading 
positions could suffer significant losses in both their trading and loan books following large 
macroeconomic shocks. This is because large swings in financial market prices and rates, 
such as steep increases in interest rates and exchange rate depreciations, have the potential 
to negatively impact the creditworthiness of households and firms, in addition to causing 
significant trading book losses. It is also because severe economic downturns that would be 
expected to lead to substantial loan-book losses are often associated with sharp declines in 
equity prices, sharp increases in credit spreads and other changes in financial markets. 
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Therefore, stress tests of a single book have the potential to seriously underestimate the total 
losses a bank could suffer under adverse macroeconomic developments. 
In our view, these two flaws in the stress testing practices of large banks represent a serious 
threat to financial stability. This is in part because the other main way that banks measure 
and manage their market and credit risks, the use of quantitative risk management models 
(QRMMs) such as value-at-risk, does not adequately measure risks associated with extreme 
events. The proper management of these so-called tail risks must therefore rely on effective 
stress testing. Moreover, QRMMs usually focus on either market or credit risk but not the 
combined losses across trading and loan books.
3 We therefore believe that macro stress 
tests that are based on sufficiently severe, yet plausible, macroeconomic shocks and that 
induce large banks to estimate (at least) the sum of their market and credit risk losses could 
improve the resilience of financial systems. Macro stress tests of this type could thus be a 
useful part of enhanced macroprudential policies. This is the motivation for the discussion of 
macro stress tests and sources of systemic risk that follows in Sections 2 and 3. Section 4 
provides a brief conclusion. 
2.  General macro stress testing methodology 
A macro stress test can be bottom up, top down or a combination of the two approaches. A 
bottom-up macro stress test is based on the results of individual stress tests conducted by 
the financial institutions themselves; however, all the institutions involved would rely on the 
same assumptions about future economic developments that are produced by the supervisor 
(or central bank), who also exercises some control over the many assumptions and bank 
internal models underpinning the exercise. In contrast, a top-down macro stress test is 
completely designed and performed by the supervisor and the same assumptions and 
models are applied to all institutions’ balance sheet data.  
These issues, and others, are discussed in greater detail in the large literature concerned 
with macro stress testing. Because macro stress tests have been performed for a number of 
years under the Financial Sector Assessment Programmes (FSAPs) of the IMF and World 
Bank, these institutions have published much of this literature (see, among others, Blaschke 
et al (2001), Jones et al (2004), IMF and World Bank (2005) and Čihák (2007)). Of course, 
financial sector supervisors and central banks also conduct macro stress tests outside 
FSAPs as part of their efforts to safeguard financial stability. The key underlying assumptions 
and results of macro stress tests, both conducted within and outside FSAPs, are sometimes 
published in financial stability reviews.
4 As the literature on macro stress testing makes clear, 
insurance companies and other non-bank financial institutions are sometimes included in the 
group of firms covered by a macro stress test. However, because of the important role of 
banks in the provision of credit, and also their reliance on short-term funding, macro stress 
tests usually focus on a country’s banking sector. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, an 
analysis of credit risk is usually an important part of a macro stress test. Because 
macroeconomic risk is arguably the main common source of loss for many credit exposures, 
macro stress tests almost always estimate the impact an economic downturn (or slowdown) 
would have on banks’ credit losses. Other risks may also be covered by the exercise, as we 
discuss in Section 3.  
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Sensitivity tests and scenario analysis 
There are two main ways to form the adverse shocks that underpin stress tests.
5 One 
approach assumes that only a single risk factor undergoes a significant change. These are 
known as sensitivity tests. An advantage of these tests is that, because only a single variable 
is shocked, they may be relatively easy to implement. Unfortunately, however, sensitivity 
tests may lack plausibility, because in a stress event it is unlikely that only a single key 
variable will be significantly affected. Nevertheless, many macro stress tests still rely on a 
single-variable shock as their starting point.  
A more plausible approach to stress testing is a scenario analysis that examines the impact 
of changes in a number of key variables. Because it is a more plausible approach, and more 
likely to lead to an accurate estimate of the sum of credit and market risk losses under 
adverse developments, it is our preferred starting point for a macro stress test. Of course, it 
is more difficult to specify how a number of variables would move together during a stress 
event. The use of macroeconomic models can help address this challenge, because they 
can restrict the co-movements of variables to be consistent with economic theory.  
The variables typically shocked in macro stress tests, in either sensitivity tests or scenarios, 
are interest and exchange rates, measures of inflation and unemployment, GDP and 
property prices. A central bank’s official macroeconomic forecast, obtained from its 
macroeconomic model, usually serves as the starting point for deciding on shock sizes. 
Shocks should be, while plausible, also large. This is because large shocks are more likely to 
pose a significant threat to financial stability and also because they may not be adequately 
reflected in firms’ internal risk management practices.  
Assessing the impact of a shock 
Whether a single- or multi-variable shock underpins a macro stress test, it is important to 
specify an appropriate time horizon over which the effects of the disturbance will be traced. 
An appropriate time horizon will balance competing forces. On the one hand, it probably 
takes a relatively long time for most of the credit losses associated with an adverse shock, 
such as a significant decline in domestic economic activity, to be realised. Given that most 
macro stress tests aim to include estimates of losses from credit exposures, this argues for a 
relatively long time horizon. On the other hand, a shorter time horizon makes it less important 
to model changes in financial institutions’ portfolios. In practice, the time horizon of a macro 
stress test is usually between one and three years. 
Another issue is the metric used to evaluate whether a financial institution or system would 
be able to absorb a particular measure of loss, be it expected loss or the maximum loss with 
some probability. The standard metric is to assess the measure of loss relative to capital or 
assets, taking into consideration estimates of current and future net income of financial 
institutions. Forecasts of net income are commonly based only on past average income. 
While it would be preferable to model how a large number of components of income would 
evolve under the stress scenario, this is no easy task. This is because the incomes of 
financial institutions depend in complicated ways on a large number of factors, including the 
extent to which income sources are diversified. This is unfortunate because, in the event of 
losses, net income protects capital.  
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3.   Sources of systemic risk 
Macro stress tests are useful for shedding light on potential sources of systemic risk. 
Systemic risk can be appreciable when important financial institutions have large, common 
exposures to macroeconomic developments, financial market prices or real estate prices. 
“Short memories” could play an important role in the build-up of large, common exposures 
(especially after a prolonged period of favourable economic conditions). Systemic risk can 
also arise from self-reinforcing feedback loops. In the remainder of this section we discuss a 
number of these risks in greater detail and, for the less difficult to quantify, how a macro 
stress test might attempt to measure them.  
Interest and exchange rate risk 
Financial institutions are likely to have common exposures to interest rate, and perhaps also 
exchange rate, risk. Most trading portfolios of financial institutions would probably suffer from 
unexpected increases in interest rates. The financial impact of parallel upward (and 
downward) shifts of government yield curves (base rates) can be approximated, following 
Macaulay, as the product of the interest rate change, duration and original value of 
securities. The financial impact of sharp rises in credit spreads should probably also be 
investigated, because large increases in spreads are more likely than large declines.
6 An 
estimate of exchange rate risk can be obtained by multiplying the net open FX positions of 
financial institutions, both on- and off-balance sheet, by assumed changes in key exchange 
rates. There is also an element of interest rate and exchange rate risk that shows up as 
credit risk for financial institutions, as will be discussed below.
7 
Real estate price risk 
Real estate price movements can also be a source of systemic risk, in part because of the 
importance of real estate as collateral for loans from banks and other creditors. While 
financial sector losses are usually associated with declines in the prices of commercial 
and/or residential real estate, systemic risk can be increasing during a prolonged period of 
rising real estate prices. This is especially the case if real estate markets get caught up in a 
bubble and prices rise significantly more than justified by economic fundamentals. In this 
case the eventual bursting of the bubble would likely be associated with marked falls in the 
prices of real estate, an elevated incidence of default by owners of residential and 
commercial properties and perhaps also reduced recoveries for financial institutions and 
other creditors in the case of default. 
Rising systemic risk associated with an inflating house price bubble was arguably the 
situation in the United States in the years just prior to the recent international financial crisis. 
As the bubble began to deflate after 2006, an unexpectedly large number of homeowners 
found themselves in a position of negative equity and chose to default. Given the high loan-
to-value ratios of many subprime home loans, the US subprime sector was where problems 
first emerged. However, as housing prices continued to fall in the United States, defaults also 
rose significantly for homes purchased with traditional mortgages. 
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Credit risk in the loan book 
Another key risk from a systemic perspective is the credit risk in large banks’ loan (or 
banking) books. Significant declines in real estate prices can be an important cause of losses 
in loan books; however, the most important influence is often the state of the macro 
economy, reflected in large part by the growth of domestic national income and perhaps also 
national income abroad through its effect on exports.
8 All else being equal, more rapid 
income growth both at home and abroad would arguably make it easier for corporate and 
household borrowers to service their debts. Changes in interest and exchange rates can also 
influence the creditworthiness of banks’ counterparties. In the case of households and non-
financial firms, increases in interest rates might be expected to decrease their 
creditworthiness, especially if a significant amount of their debt is in floating rate 
agreements.
9 It is less clear what moves in exchange rates might do most damage to a 
bank’s loan book. In the absence of complete currency hedging, exporters with negligible 
foreign currency debts would likely become greater credit risks when the domestic currency 
appreciates. However, when companies and households have significant foreign currency 
debts, but insignificant foreign currency income, a depreciation of the domestic currency can 
seriously damage their creditworthiness.
10   
One way of measuring credit risk in loan books is to project losses under an adverse 
macroeconomic scenario. In bottom-up macro stress tests, calculations are based on banks’ 
own internal models using common scenarios for all of them. In top-down macro stress tests, 
regression methods applied to aggregate data can be used to project how the particular 
measure of credit losses, for the economy as a whole or a group of banks, would evolve 
under assumed paths for key macroeconomic variables such as GDP, real estate prices, 
interest rates and exchange rates.
11 Often the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total 
loans is the measure of credit losses in top-down tests; however, this indicator can 
significantly underestimate credit risk in the case of rapid credit growth, because it usually 
takes time for bad loans to reveal themselves.  
Another approach to measuring credit risk in loan books is macroeconomic credit risk 
modelling. This approach, pioneered by Wilson (1997), relates credit risk to the “health” of 
the domestic economy as revealed by a number of macroeconomic variables. In the default 
mode application of the model, probabilities of default (PDs) for different classes of 
borrowers are related to macroeconomic variables, and the time series dynamics of the 
macroeconomic variables are also modelled. The approach is thus capable of predicting how 
PDs will evolve in the future under alternative macroeconomic scenarios, given initial 
macroeconomic conditions. These starting conditions could be the actual values of 
macroeconomic variables or those that would be associated with a particular stress scenario. 
Using further simulations, the conditional loss distribution associated with a bank’s loan book 
can be derived.   
In the case of corporate exposures, it may be possible to perform a more refined analysis of 
expected losses under a stress scenario with the use of statistical credit rating models. 
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being a key determinant of credit risk more broadly. 
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These models associate with each exposure a score which is then related to the exposure’s 
PD. An expected loss for the exposure can be calculated as a product of the PD, the 
exposure at default (EAD) and the loss-given-default (LGD). Statistical credit rating models 
include obligor-specific data when generating scores. When these models also incorporate 
macroeconomic variables, they can be used to compute “stressed” scores and PDs for 
obligors that would be associated with adverse macroeconomic developments.
12 These 
stress losses for individual exposures can be aggregated to obtain total stress losses for the 
corporate loan book. 
Credit risk parameters 
Short time series and structural breaks can prevent the use of some of the methods for 
evaluating credit risk discussed above. In this case, expected credit losses for an entire 
portfolio can be calculated as the product of the portfolio-average PD and LGD and the total 
portfolio EAD. Perhaps the biggest challenge with this approach is to determine appropriate 
LGDs, and this parameter is very often determined mainly by expert judgment. Real estate 
prices can often inform this judgment, because of real estate’s important role as collateral. 
EAD can be expressed as the difference between outstanding loans and NPL. Expected NPL 
depend on the inflow to NPL (determined by PD estimates), outflows (as written-off or sell-
out of existing NPL) and the current stock of NPL. Formally, 
t t t t t t NPL r NPL Loans PD NPL NPL        ) ( 1   (1) 
where r represents the average write-off (or sell-out) rate of existing NPL.
13 
Expert judgment can also be used to link the PD of a portfolio to a single macroeconomic 
variable; alternatively, when a regression model for the growth of NPL is estimated, the PD 
for the portfolio can be easily approximated. This can be very helpful in the case of emerging 
economies where aggregate data on defaults are very often not available, but aggregate 
data on NPL are available. To see this, assume that the stock of NPL is relatively small 
compared to the stock of loans, so that equation (1) can be approximated by: 
t t t t t NPL r Loans PD NPL NPL      1   (2) 












  ) ( 1  (3) 
The approximation (3) demonstrates that the average PD depends on the growth rate of 
NPL, the average write-off rate and the initial level of NPL relative to outstanding loans.  
Self-reinforcing feedback loops 
Self-reinforcing feedback loops can also be a source of systemic risk. One such loop can 
arise when banks and other financial institutions experience large, unexpected losses. It 
would be natural to expect that lending standards might be tightened in response, in part to 
rebuild capital buffers but also as a consequence of the increase in perceived risk, and 
perhaps also elevated risk aversion, that would likely follow such losses. This could lead to a 
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further deterioration in the real economy, additional financial sector losses and further cuts in 
credit availability.
14 A self-reinforcing feedback loop can also result from asset fire sales.
15  
Although potentially important, self-reinforcing feedback loops are typically not taken into 
formal consideration in macro stress testing exercises, in part because such nonlinearities 
are difficult to model. Concern about them, and the systemic risk they potentially generate, 
can nevertheless be a motivation for macro stress tests. As noted by Bernanke (2010), one 
of the objectives of a macro stress test recently carried out in the United States (SCAP) was 
to ensure that large US banks would continue to lend to creditworthy households and firms 
even if economic conditions turned out worse than expected. To the extent that the SCAP 
was credible in this respect, expectations were more likely concentrated on a more 
favourable future macroeconomic trajectory, with lower financial sector losses, increasing 
confidence in the health of the US financial system. 
4.   Conclusion 
This paper provides an introduction to macro stress tests and some of the risks that they 
attempt to assess. It also argues that these exercises could improve the resilience of 
financial systems because, in our view, banks’ stress testing practices are seriously flawed. 
One reason is that the assumed developments underpinning stress tests appear not to be 
severe enough. Another is the tendency for banks’ stress tests to focus on either the trading 
or loan book but not the combined market and credit risk losses likely to accompany adverse 
macroeconomic shocks. We believe that macro stress tests that have severe, yet plausible, 
multi-variable macroeconomic shocks as their starting point and estimate (at least) market 
and credit risk losses could therefore support the preservation of financial stability. Macro 
stress tests of this type could thus be a useful part of enhanced macroprudential policies. 
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